NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe speaks during a press conference to announce the naming Columbia Point in the Colorado Rocky Mountains in Washington, Tuesday, June 10, 2002. Behind him is Interior Secretary Gail Norton, left, and the family of the late astronaut David Brown: brother Doug Brown, mother Dorothy Brown and father Judge Paul Brown, right. The naming is in honor of the seven NASA Astronauts, including Brown, who perished in the Space Shuttle Columbia earlier this year. (AP Photo/Gerald Herbert)
11:43 AM EST June 12, 2003
The Associated Press
WASHINGTONNASA failed to learn important lessons from its past mistakes and needs to improve its oversight of shuttle contractors, some of America's top space experts told Columbia investigators Thursday. But they said declining budgets at the space agency may not have contributed directly to the tragedy.
"Spacecraft failures persist, and there is no assurance that lessons are being applied toward future mission successes," said Allen Li, a NASA specialist at the General Accounting Office. GAO has previously criticized NASA for insufficiently managing risks, communicating poorly among employees and using inadequate engineering practices.
Li was among officials testifying at a final public hearing for the 13-member Columbia Accident Investigation Board before it retreats behind closed doors to prepare its formal report on the disaster. The board has indicated it wants to finish prior to the August recess by lawmakers in Washington.
Other witnesses included Marcia Smith, who studies America's space program at the Congressional Research Service, which advises lawmakers on policy issues, and Russell Turner, a former chief executive at the United Space Alliance LLC, NASA's primary shuttle contractor.
Smith reviewed the history of NASA's budget, as requested by the White House and approved by Congress. She cautioned that it will be difficult for investigators to directly tie the decline in shuttle funding to the February tragedy.
"It's very difficult to tie this into events like the Columbia tragedy," she said. She added that it was "not clear that an increased budget would have helped" NASA to appreciate the risks that insulating foam might damage shuttles on takeoff.
The budget for the shuttle approved by lawmakers during the last decade peaked at $4.04 billion in 1993, according to congressional researchers. It fell steadily until it dropped as low as $2.93 billion in 1998 and has gradually risen to $3.27 billion for fiscal 2002.
"It may well be that you'll conclude ... the shuttle budget was cut too far, but it will be interesting to see if you can tie that directly" to events that led to Columbia's destruction, Smith said.
Investigators believe a chunk of insulating foam smashed against Columbia's left wing roughly 81 seconds after liftoff, loosening a protective panel on the wing's leading edge. That permitted searing temperatures to penetrate the spacecraft during its fiery return 16 days later, melting key structures aboard Columbia until it tumbled out of control at nearly 13,000 miles per hour over the southwestern United States. All seven astronauts died.
Turner, currently president at Honeywell Engines, Systems and Services, disclosed that the United Space Alliance could stand to lose up to $70 million in penalties and forfeited payments if NASA determines its work contributed to the Columbia disaster.
"A bunch of that is money we would have to pay back to the government," Turner said.
Under questioning by the board, Turner said the contractor responsible for the shuttle's external tank - the source of the suspected breakaway foam - is Lockheed Martin Corp., one of the founding partners of the United Space Alliance. But he said the work done by Lockheed on the external tank is distinct from its participation - and its potential liability - in the space alliance.
"This is very funny," said board member Douglas D. Osheroff, a physics professor at Stanford University.
Turner defended the work that the alliance performed under the so-called "Space Flight Operations Contract," an omnibus agreement with NASA for shuttle work. He said safety and quality are "good or better" compared to other contractors and that costs are lower.
With the mystery of the shuttle's destruction on Feb. 1 largely solved, investigators have started work on draft versions of their final report, expected to include broad criticisms of NASA's judgment, budget and management of the shuttle program.
Li told the board that the space agency "is at a critical juncture, and major management improvements are needed." He added that NASA has made "noteworthy progress" in improving its oversight of contract workers, but "much work remains."
The board, after four months of study, has already expressed concerns about the space agency's dwindling budgets over the past decade and NASA's alternating control over shuttles between managers at its Johnson Space Center in Houston and its Washington headquarters.
Tests conducted by the board last week provided powerful support for the theory that foam had cracked Columbia's protective panel. Investigators fired a 1.68-pound foam chunk at 525 mph toward a similar panel, which cracked and was knocked out of alignment enough to create a dangerous gap in a shuttle wing.
---
On the Net:
NASA: https://www.nasa.gov
https://www.nasa.gov
CAIB: https://www.caib.us
https://www.caib.us
|